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I. INTRODUCTION
Money laundering is a serious challenge to the maintenance of law and order
in the Americas and threatens the integrity, reliability, and stability of govern-
ments, financial institutions, and commerce.1 The United States is the first nation
to develop extensive anti-money laundering laws and enforcement mechanisms
reaching across its borders.2 Several international anti-money laundering model
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1. U.S. DEP'T OF TREASURY, TREASURY NEWS: SUMniT OF THE AMER ICAS IISTERIAL
CoNNFUENcE CONCER~NG THE LAUNDRmING OF PROCEEDS AND INTRmm.mNTALrriEs OF CRMES
(Buenos Aires, Argentina, Dec. 2, 1994) Ministerial Communiqud 4 (1995) [hereinafter
Buenos Aires Communiqu6 1995].
2. See infra note 37 and accompanying text (discussing the impact of the signing of
the United States anti-money laundering law).
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regulations and treaties use the United States law as a model.3 Money laundering
has vast detrimental effects on society: it undermines economic development and
stability and legitimizes organized crime and drug trafficking proceeds. The
United States government ranks countries by levels of priority which indicate
their need to amend banking regulations and adopt anti-money laundering laws.'
Brazil is a medium-high priority country for the United States.6 A significant
amount of drug traffic flows through Brazil,7 allowing illicit proceeds to circulate
freely throughout the Brazilian economy. 8 The Brazilian government has ratified
the essential money laundering international agreements but has not implemented
the necessary legislation. 9
This Comment focuses on Brazil's pending adoption of stringent anti-money
laundering laws and the proposed legislation's adherence to international agree-
3. Duncan E. Alford, Anti-Money Laundering Regulations: A Burden on Financial
Institutions, 19 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 437, 442 (1994) (discussing the similarities
between the international treaties and the money laundering statutes of the United States).
4. Phyllis Solomon, Are Money Launderers All Washed Up in the Western Hemi-
sphere? The OAS Model Regulations, 17 HASTINGS INT'L & Cohe. L. REv. 433, 434-37
(1994) (commenting on the money laundering methods that drug traffickers previously
used to legitimize their proceeds); see generally Margaret Samuel, Non-Cash Alternatives
And Money Laundering; An American Model For Canadian Consumers' Protection, 30
AM. Bus. L.J. 169 (1992) (stating the fight against money laundering is a significant con-
tribution on behalf of the financial community to fight the war against illegal drugs).
5. U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, INT'L NARcoTIcs CONTROL STRATEGY REP. 516 (1996)
[hereinafter INCSR 1996] (discussing the methods used to rank the countries with lenient
banking regulations). The Department of State Bureau for International Narcotics and Law
Enforcement Affairs derives its rankings from a number of factors which indicate: 1) the
money laundering situation of a nation/territory, 2) why this situation has international
ramifications; 3) the effect on interests of the United States; 4) whether the government
has taken appropriate legislative actions and the coverage of that legislation; 5) whether
the laws are effectively implemented; and 6) "where U.S. interests are involved, the degree
of cooperation between the [foreign nation] and the U.S. [government] agencies." Id. The
INCSR provides a general check-list that drug money managers use to detect the vulner-
ability of a financial center. Id. at 516-17.
6. Id. at 520.
7. See Vannildo Mendes, Drug Money Remittances Total $1 Billion Annually,
FORFIGN BROADCAST INFO. SERVICE FOR LATIN AM., Dec. 1, 1994, at 20-21 (finding that
Brazilian drug traffickers send $1 billion abroad which exceeds the $877 million in direct
foreign investment in Brazil in 1993); Sao Paulo Regarded as 'Financial Center'for Drug
Trade, FOREIGN BROADCAST INFo. SERVICE FOR LATIN AM., Dec. 1, 1994, at 20 (stating that
the amount of drugs seized in 1994 would have yielded $320 million in profits),
8. INCSR 1996, supra note 5, at 73 (discussing the transit patterns through Brazil
from neighboring countries).
9. See infra notes 78, 93, 108, 152 and accompanying text (stating Brazil's ratifica-
tion of the United Nations Convention, the Basle Convention, the OAS Model Regulations,
and the Narcotics Treaty with the United States). The international agreements are execu-
tive agreements, and are therefore not binding until the parties enact the appropriate leg-
islation.
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ments and a bilateral agreement with the United States. The pending legislation
aims to decrease the level of financial crimes in Brazil and facilitate the develop-
ment of a sound economy by attracting legitimate foreign investments. Part I pro-
vides an introduction to money laundering. Part II defines money laundering and
its relation to the international economy. Part MI details the money laundering
process. Part IV provides a brief overview of United States money laundering
policies. Part V discusses the history of Brazil's efforts to combat money laun-
dering, its involvement in international initiatives and organizations, and its cur-
rent and proposed money laundering legislation. Part VI recommends that Brazil
enforce the pending anti-money laundering legislation and join efforts with the
United States to develop regulatory agencies and proficient training programs for
bank officers. Adherence to these principals would place Brazil in compliance
with the international agreements to which it is a party and the demands of the
United States.
II. MONEY LAUNDERING: DEFINITION AND LINK TO
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMY
Money is the lifeline of all international organized crime groups."0 Money
laundering is the process by which criminals attempt to conceal the true origin
and ownership of the proceeds of their criminal act.' If undertaken successfully,
it also allows criminals to maintain control over those proceeds and create a le-
gitimate backdrop for their sources of income. '2  Laundering the proceeds of
criminal activity through the international financial system is vital to the success
of criminal operations.
13
10. See Michael Zeldin, Money Laundering 101: Everything you Wanted to Know
About Money Laundering But Were Afraid to Ask, in Focus ON MONEY Laumm mm &
ASSET FoRFEURE: AN INT'L PRsp. 2 (1994) (providing a general overview of the money
laundering process and the applicable United States law).
11. See OFFICE Or TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMNT, CONGRESS OF THE UNrrED STATES, In-
formation Technologies For the Control of Money Laundering, xii (1995) [hereinafter
OFncE OF TECm. AssENsTm-r] (defining money laundering as "[d]isguising the origin and
ownership of money, often by placing it in a bank, moving it through multiple transac-
tions."). See also Kirk W. Munroe, Money Laundering: The Latest Darling of the Prose-
cutor's Nursery, in Focus ON MONEY LAUDERING & ASSET FoRFEnUmE: A ItT'fL PERSP.
16, (1993) (defining money laundering and the increased criminialization of money laun-
dering). The laundering of proceeds of illegal activity is only necessary if the proceeds
cannot be absorbed into the criminal's lifestyle. Samuel, supra note 4, at 174 (comment-
ing on the difficulty of legitimizing drug proceeds). For example, $100,000 can be ab-
sorbed by purchasing cars and clothing, traveling, and eating in restaurants. Id. Drug pro-
ceeds, on the other hand, are too large to be absorbed. For example, five thousand pounds
of cocaine, if sold on the streets, would generate $355 million in cash. Id.
12. See Munroe, supra note 11, at 16 (discussing the inherent need for criminals to
make illicit funds appear legitimate); Samuel, supra note 4, at 170 (commenting on the
evil of money laundering because it allows criminals to profit from their illicit activity).
13. See Samuel, supra note 4, at 175 (remarking that an absence of money laundering
1997
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Drug traffickers, in the past, were accustomed to using domestic banks to laun-
der their proceeds.1 4 With the increase in drug trafficking profits, however, do-
mestic banks were unable to handle the large sums of cash without notifying law
enforcement. 5 The stricter banking regulations forced launderers to look
abroad.16 Increased integration of financial markets and the removal of barriers
for the free movement of capital enhance the ability to launder criminal money
and complicate the tracing process.' 7 International money laundering is therefore
more complicated because launderers need to seek out countries with strong bank
secrecy laws.' 8
III. MONEY LAUNDERING PROCESS
There is no one method of laundering money. Methods range from the pur-
chase and resale of luxury items to the passing of money through a complex inter-
national web of legitimate businesses and "shell" companies.' 9 Despite the vari-
ety of methods available, the laundering process proceeds in three stages: 1)
placement, 2) layering, and 3) integration.20 These stages may compromise nu-
merous transactions by the launderers and alert an investment business to crimi-
nal activity. 21 The three basic steps may occur as separate and distinct phases,they may occur simultaneously, or, more commonly, they may overlap.22
would undermine the reason to commit the initial crime).
14. See infra notes 36-50 and accompanying text (discussing the history of the Bank
Secrecy Act).
15. Alford, supra note 3, at 438-41.
16. Id. at 440 (discussing the methods used by money launderers and the increased
regulations placed on banks to deter illegal activity); see generally M. Cherif Bassiouni,
Critical Reflections on International and National Control of Drugs, 18 DENv. J. INT'L L.
& PoL'Y 311 (1990) (reviewing present national and international efforts to reduce the
production and consumption of illicit narcotics).
17. See FNCEN Mulls Offering Guidance on Anti-Money Laundering Programs,
COMPLiANCE REP., Mar. 4, 1996, at 1, 13 (commenting that the increased security on banks
is forcing money launderers to utilize broker/dealers whose compliance departments are
not structured to combat money laundering); Laura Lorber, Compliance Clarified Money
Laundering, COMPLANtCE RErP., Mar. 4, 1996, at 12 (discussing broker/dealers that are
tightening their compliance policies).
18. See Charles A. Intriago, Money Laundering: New Penalties, Risks, Burdens for
Bankers, BANx~m MAG., Mar.-Apr. 1990, at 54 (discussing international initiatives to
combat money laundering). The optimal goal of international agreements is to eliminate
bank secrecy. 1d. Bank secrecy laws are the "traditional shield" for nations to desist from
international cooperation with money laundering cases. Id.
19. See OF=IoS OF TECH. AssEsSMEmr, supra note 11, at xiii (defining shell companies
as "[corporations] that exists only formally, incorporated solely to serve as a cover for ille-
gal operations").
20. Zeldin, supra note 10, at 4 (discussing the methods used to launder money).
21. Id. at 4 (discussing the methods used to launder money); see also infra note 92
(discussing a famous international money laundering transaction).
22. Id. How the basic steps are used depends on the available laundering mechanisms
[12:2
BRAZILAN MONEY LA UNDERING
The first step, placement, is the physical disposal of cash proceeds derived
from illegal activity. 23 This step is the most vulnerable to law enforcement detec-
tion because of the practical problem of moving large quantities of cash into the
layering stage.2 4 A typical international transaction requires the launderer to
move the illicit proceeds from the originating jurisdiction to a foreign bank ac-
count 25 Launderers accomplish this by taking advantage of weaknesses in na-
tional regulatory schemes2 6 via: 1) electronic transfers, 2) smuggling cash abroad,
or 3) courier services. 27
The second step, layering, separates illicit proceeds from their source by cre-
ating complex layers of financial transactions designed to disguise the audit
trail2 8and provide anonymity.29 This phase is more resistant to law enforcement
intervention due to the mechanics of international banking.30 For example, a
launderer can legitimize the money by depositing it in a foreign bank account, a
securities account, or a shell corporation. 3'
and the requirements of the criminal organizations. Id. at 5. Certain points of vulnerabil-
ity have been identified in the laundering process: entry of cash into the financial system;
cross-border flows of cash; and transfers within and from the financial system. Id. at 5.
23. Id. at 4.
24. See Scott Sultzer, Money Laundering: The Scope of the Problem and Attempts to
Combat It, 63 TENN. L. Rav. 143, 149 (1995) (analyzing the placement step of money
laundering).
25. See Barbara Webster & Michael S. McCampbell, International Money Lander-
ing: Research and Investigation Join Forces, NATIONAL INSTm= OF JusTI-C, 4-5 (1992)
(commenting on the various methods available to money launderers to remove money from
a country); see also Solomon, supra note 4, at 436-37 (outlining an international money
laundering scheme with the use of a "shell" company); Molly Moore & John Ward Ander-
son, Drug Profits Crisscrossing Border Plague US., Mexican Prosecutors, WASH. Posy,
July 8, 1996, at Al, A9 (describing an international money laundering transaction and dia-
gramming the process).
26. International Conference on Preventing and Controlling Moncy-Laundering and
The Use of the Proceeds of Crime: A Global Approach, Report and Recommendations,
U.N. Doe. E/Conf.88/n, at 4 (1994) (discussing trends in money laundering techniques and
its expanding global nature).
27. Id. See also Alford, supra note 3, at 441 (commenting on the various methods of
transporting illicit proceeds abroad).
28. See Zeldin, supra note 10, at 5 (discussing the necessity for the layering process to
disrupt the paper trail that regulatory agencies would use to trace the transaction to its ille-
gitimate source). The audit trail is defined as the transactional statements that the finan-
cial institutions maintain when a client uses their services. Id. A money laundering sce-
nario involves multiple transfers of cash into false and legitimate accounts which makes
following the 'paper trail' extremely difficult. Id.
29. Id. (commenting that multiple transactions eventually separate the proceeds from
their source). Money launderers use international wire transfers to jurisdictions with bank
secrecy laws and the attomey-client privilege to maintain anonymity. Id.
30. See generally Sultzer, supra note 24, at 150-51 (discussing the various methods of
layering and its vulnerability to detection in the international arena).
31. See OmImcE oF TECH. AsssshmET, supra note 11, at xiii (defining a shell com-
pany).
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The third step, integration, creates apparent legitimacy to criminally derived
wealth.32 If the layering process succeeds, integration schemes place the laun-
dered proceeds back into the economy so that they appear as legitimate business
profits.33 The authorities can seize entire accounts, including legitimate ones, if
integration fails. 34  In this final step, the launderer repatriates and invests the
money in businesses and in personal and real property of its jurisdiction of ori-
gin.3
5
IV. OVERVIEW OF UNITED STATES MONEY
LAUNDERING LAWS
In the 1980s the United States enacted comprehensive laws to address the in-
creasing problem of money laundering; the Bank Secrecy Act,36 including its
amendments: the Money Laundering Control Act, 37 the Annunzio-Wylie Act,38
32. See Zeldin, supra note 10, at 5 (discussing the methods of integrating the money
back into the economy).
33. See id. at 5 (stating that once the money appears to be clean, the criminal can
spend it with impunity).
34. Sultzer, supra note 24, at 151 (discussing the legal ramifications of failed integra-
tion). See also Federal Government's Response to Money Laundering. Hearings Before
the Comm. on Banking, Finance, & Urban Affairs, 103d Cong. 43-45 (1993) (statement of
Tom Clifford, Assistant Special Agent, Drug Enforcement Agency).
35. Alford, supra note 3, at 441; see also Webster & McCampbell, supra note 25, at 5
(discussing legitimizing and repatriating illegal funds).
36. Bank Secrecy Act, Pub. L. No. 91-508, 84 Stat. 1114-1124 (1970) (codified as
amended at 31 U.S.C. §§ 5311-5344 (1988 & Supp. V 1995)) [hereinafter BSA]; see Sult-
zer, supra note 24, at 151-54 (discussing the evolution of the Bank Secrecy Act).
37. Money Laundering Control Act, Pub. L. No. 99-570, 100 Stat. 3207 (1986) (codi-
fied as amended in 18 U.S.C. §§ 1956, 1957 and 31 U.S.C. 0§ 5324-5326 (1988 & Supp.
V 1994)) [hereinafter MLCA]; see Intriago, supra note 17, at 51-53 (discussing the
amendments to the Bank Secrecy Act); see Sultzer, supra note 24, at 158 (providing gen-
eral historical background of money laundering legislation). MLCA applies to non-U.S.
citizens located outside the United States as long as the unlawful conduct occurs "in part"
within U.S. borders. M4LCA, 18 U.S.C. § 1956(0. The MLCA makes criminal structur-
ing, attempted structuring, and aiding and abetting in structuring transactions. Id. § 5324.
Specifically, a depositor will deposit slightly less than $10,000 in several financial and
non-financial institutions to avoid the reporting of the cash transaction, a practice known as
"smurfing". MLCA also prohibits the concealment of criminal profits. Id. § 1960. The
concealment may occur by anyone who "conducts, controls, manages, supervises, directs,
or owns all or part of a business, knowing that the business is an illegal money transmit-
ting business." Id. Another provision of the MLCA attempts to combat organized crime
by attacking the profits of criminals. See MLCA, §§ 981, 982 (providing for civil and
criminal forfeiture of any real or personal property involved in a transaction that violates
the money laundering statutes).
38. Annunzio-Wylie Anti-Money Laundering Act, Pub. L. No. 102-550, 106 Stat. 3672
(1992) (codified in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C., 18 U.S.C., and 31 U.S.C. (Supp. IV
1992)) [hereinafter Annunzio-Wylie Act].
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and most recently, the 1994 Money Laundering Suppression Act.3 9 In 1986
President Ronald Reagan signed the Money Laundering Control Act, enacting the
first law in the world that made unlawful money laundering occurring nationally
and internationally.40 The increase in the drug trade forced Congress to create
stricter laws.41 These laws serve two purposes: 1) they make the act of laundering
funds a crime,42 and 2) they establish reporting and record keeping require-
39. Pub. L. No. 103-325, § 407(a)(1), 108 Stat. 2169,2247-48 (1994) (to be codified
at 31 U.S.C. § 5311); see also The Anti-Money LaunderingAct of.1993: Hearings on HR.
3235 Before the Subcomm. on Financial Institutions Supervision, Regulation and Deposit
Insurance of the House Comm. on Banking, Finance, and Urban Affairs, 103d Cong. 4-6
(1993) (statement of Hon. Ronald K Knoble, Assistant Secretary for Enforcement, Dep't
of Treasury). The substantive focus of the Money Laundering Suppression Act is to com-
bat money laundering achieved through non-bank financial institutions and to reconcile the
anti-money laundering laws with the interests of the financial services industry. Id. See
Lisa A. Barbot, Comment, Money Laundering: An International Challenge, 3 TuL. J. hrr'L
& Comp. L. 161, 190-93 (1995) (discussing Congress' response to various criticisms from
financial institutions concerning the reporting requirements); Sultzer, supra note 24, at
216-19 (reviewing in detail the specific aspects of MLSA). The amendment required fi-
nancial institutions to exempt from filing Currency Transaction Reports (CTR's) busi-
nesses which "have little or no value for law enforcement purposes." Pub. L. No. 103-325,
§ 402, 108 Stat. 2160, 2242 (to be codified at 31 U.S.C. § 5313(d)); see also John J.
Byrne, Bank Secrecy Act Compliance in the 1990s: Banking Efforts Are Rewarded,
BA ncms MAG., Jan.-Feb. 1996, at 16-17 (describing a two-tier system viich vould reduce
the number of CTR filings). This alleviated the burden imposed on banks for filing cash
transaction reports. Id.
40. See Munroe, supra note 11, at 16 (stating the importance of the signing of the
Money Laundering Act). The "Laundering of monetary instruments" focuses on criminals
and conspirators who seek to either hide the origins of tainted money, or to use the money
to further their criminal operations. 18 U.S.C. § 1956.
41. Barbot, supra note 39, at 184-85 (describing the drug trade as the impetus for the
United States Congress' decision to enact anti-money laundering legislation); see generally
Michael A. DeFeo, Depriving International Narcotics Trafgickers and Other Organized
Criminals of Illegal Proceeds and Combating Money Laundering, 18 DMI. J. IrT'L L. &
Poi'Y 406 (1990) (discussing the United States's efforts to combat international money
laundering); Intriago, supra note 18, at 50 (describing Congress' utilization of banks as
soldiers in the war against drugs); ef Dr. Joseph D. Douglass Jr., Banks and Drug Sabo-
tage of U.S. Society: Vested Interests Impede Drug War, INT'L CURRENcY REv., Winter
1995-96, at 82 (proposing that corruption at all levels of the government has undermined
the "war on drugs" in the United States.).
42. Pub. L. No. 99-570, 100 Stat. 3207-18 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 1956-
1957, 31 U.S.C. §§ 5324-5326). Section 1956 (a)(1) requires proof that a putative defen-
dant knew that the property involved in the financial transactions vas the proceeds of an
unlawful activity and thereafter conducted a transaction ith those proceeds .ith the intent
to: a) engage in tax fraud or tax evasion; b) conceal or disguise the proceeds; c) promote
the continuation of the crime; or d) avoid a state or federal transaction reporting require-
ment 18 U.S.C. § 1956 (a)(1). The second statute, Engaging in Monetary Transactions in
Property Derived from Specified Unlawfl Activity, vastly expands the potential reach of
section 1956's criminal prohibition against money laundering. 18 U.S.C. 0 1957. Section
1997
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ments43 for cash or monetary instrument transactions." The latter requirement
necessitates the creation of a clear audit trail that the government can use to detect
and prevent laundering.4 5 Critics of the legislation argue that it creates various
restrictions that unfairly burden financial institutions in the pursuit of curtailing
money laundering.
46
The evolution of the United States money laundering laws has seen an attempt
1957 encompasses situations where a defendant's criminal act is the acceptance of funds
greater than $10,000 with knowledge of their illicit origin. Id. § 1957(a). The statute does
not require that a defendant conduct the transaction for any additional criminal purpose.
Id. The statute makes criminal trades and businesses who knowingly do business with in-
dividuals or entities that possess criminal proceeds. Id. The penalty for transactions in
violation of the statute is a maximum ten year term imprisonment, a fine of $250,000 or
twice the value of the proceeds laundered, whichever is greater, or both. Id. 1957(b).
43. 31 U.S.C. § 5313(a). The BSA requires domestic financial institutions to file a
Currency Transaction Report (CTR) for each deposit, withdrawal, or exchange of currency
or other payment or transfer by, through, or to a financial institution that involves more
than $10,000 in currency. Id. 0 5313(a). Multiple same day transactions must be aggre-
gated if the financial institution involved in the transactions knows that the transactions: 1)
are being conducted by or on behalf of the same person; and 2) involve either cash-in or
cash-out in excess of $10,000. Id.
44. 18 U.S.C. § 1957. A monetary transaction includes: a deposit, withdrawal, trans-
fer, or exchange of cash, personal and bank checks, money orders in any form, wire trans-
fers, investment securities by, through, or to a financial institution. 18 U.S.C. §
1957(0(1); see also 18 U.S.C. §§ 1956(c)(3)-(4) (defining transactions in both financial
and nonfinancial institutions). A financial institution is defined broadly, encompassing
nontraditional financial institutions: stock brokerage houses, currency exchange dealers,
check cashing services, credit card companies, insurance companies, precious metal deal-
ers, pawn shops, loan or finance companies, travel agencies, money transmittal services,
automobile, boat or plane dealers, or the United States Postal Service. 18 U.S.C. §
1956(c)(4), 31 U.S.C. § 5312(a)(2). The amendments to the BSA requires all financial
institutions, not just banks, to adopt anti-money laundering programs. 31 U.S.C. § 5344.
See Suzanna J. Costello, Compliance for International Bankers, in Focus ON MONEY
LAUNDERING & AsSET FoRFEIrruRE: AN INT'L PERSP., July 1993, at 33 (discussing what
bank examiners should be looking for, commonly known as "know-your-customer"). The
Annunzio-Wylie Act also obligates the reporting of suspicious transactions, those persons
suspected of criminal activity, and the identity of non-bank financial institutions. 31 U.S.C.
§ 5344. If there is a violation of the Act the penalty depends on whether the bank is for-
eign or domestic. 12 U.S.C. §§ 93 (c), 1818. Domestic banks may have their charters or
deposit insurance revoked while foreign banks may have their U.S. licenses canceled. 12
U.S.C § 3105; see also Byrne, supra note 39, at 15-16 (discussing the penalties for finan-
cial institutions for failing to report suspicious transactions).
45. See supra note 28 and accompanying text (defining the audit trail).
46. See Alford, supra note 3, at 437-38 (analyzing the regulatory burden on banks to
curb money laundering). See also Byme, supra note 39, at 15 (discussing the influence of
the American Bankers Association in Congress in creating more practical and efficient




to balance the demands of the banking industry and the Department of Justice.4"
Arguably, the law is still too broad because it requires too much paperwork and
incriminates innocent people. 8 The vast scope is beneficial, however, because it
punishes all participants of a laundering scheme, not just the narcotic traffick-
ers.4 9 Furthermore, the law is not limited to cash transactions-it encompasses all
monetary instruments and financial transactions. °
V. BRAZILIAN EFFORTS TO COMBAT MONEY LAUNDERING
Brazil is an attractive venue for money launderers because of its strong cur-
rency,51 stable economy,52 lack of anti-money laundering laws, 53 and geographic
location, since it borders many of the largest producers of illicit drugs in South
America. s ' In his first year in office, Brazilian President Fernando Herique
Cardoso and his administration demonstrated remarkable efforts in combating
money laundering.5 5 According to the United States Department of State, Brazil
47. See supra note 46 and accompanying text (discussing changes in laws to adapt to
the financial services industry).
48. See Alford, supra note 3, at 466-68 (analyzing the impact of the money laundering
statutes on the operations of financial institutions).
49. See supra note 41 and accompanying text (discussing the United States Congress's
concern to attack drug traffickers).
50. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1956, 1957.
51. See INCSR 1996, supra note 5, at 73 (stating reasons for money launderers' at-
traction to Brazil).
52. Id.
53. See id. at 74. The lack of due diligence on behalf of Brazilian financial institu-
tions facilitates the movement of illegal proceeds derived from narcotics and other unlaw-
ful activities. Id. See Bruce Zagaris, Brazilian-U.S. Financial Cooperation Under Basle
Accord, LATmAM. L. & Bus. REP., Nov. 30, 1995, at 16 (discussing the inadequate money
laundering laws in Brazil).
54. See LuIzATHEREZABAPsTADE MATros, Brazil, in In T 1ATOVAL HAMBCor ONK
DRUG CONTROL, at 121-22 (Scott B. MacDonald & Bruce Zagaris eds., 1992) (noting that
Brazil borders Colombia, Bolivia, and Peru); see also Jan Rocha, Cocaine Trade Promotes
Brazil New Regional Drugs Capital, THE GUARDIAN, June 10, 1991, at 10 (commenting
that Brazil is a drug traffickers paradise because of the open frontier, hundreds of uncon-
trolled rural airports, and modem telecommunications). Brazil is a major transit route of
Colombian, Bolivian, and Peruvian produced cocaine traveling to the North American,
Middle Eastern, and European markets. DE MATros, at 121. Brazil also facilitates air
shipments of cocaine base from Peru destined for cocaine labs in Colombia. See INCSR
1996, supra note 5, at 73 (describing the drug traffickers route via Brazil); see also, Ri-
cardo Feltrin, PF Say Rio State Cocaine Route for 23 Countries, F.B.LS FoR LATRN A'.,
Dec. 6, 1994, at 29 (claiming the state of Rio de Janeiro ships narcotics to 23 countries in
Europe, Africa, Asia, North America, Central America, and South America).
55. Matt Moffett & Jonathan Friedland, A New Latin America Faces a Devil of Old:
Rampant Corruption, WALL ST. J., July 1, 1996, at Al. Brazil's previous president
Fernando Collar de Mello, was ousted in 1992 on corruption charges. DE MATTOS, supra
note 54, at 122. Early in Collar's presidency he portrayed an image of concern vith the
1997
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has cooperated with the United States government and has made commendable
efforts to meet the goals and objectives of the United Nations Convention of
1988.56 Debates addressing money laundering legislation in the Brazilian Con-
gress date back to 1991. 5' Brazilian bank secrecy laws, however, have restricted
all administrative anti-money laundering initiatives.58 The judicial system also
lacks efficacy. 59 An insufficient number of prisons and judges has resulted in im-
punity for individuals laundering criminal proceeds. 60 The government succeeded
only in passing laws concerning the regulation of chemicals and organized
crime. 61
A. INTERNATIONAL PRESSURE
International efforts 62 have attempted to force nations to cooperate in fighting
drug problem. Id. In April of 1990, Collar jogged wearing a T-shirt stating, "Drugs: Out
of Here." ld. He also began a campaign against illicit drugs in reaction to a demonstration
by the mothers of Corumba, the capital of the state of Mato Grosso do Sul which borders
Bolivia. Id.
56. See INCSR 1996, supra note 5, at xix.
57. Id.
58. See Zagaris, supra note 53, at 16. Brazilian law does not require financial institu-
tions to develop policies and practices to curb money laundering or to train employees. Id.
Brazil will continue to be a magnet for illegally derived profits if Brazil does not enact
anti-money laundering laws and if it retains banks secrecy laws. See Solomon, supra note
4, at 454.
59. Impotence Against Drugs, LATIN AM. NEWSL. BRAziL REP., Oct. 21, 1993, at 5
(commenting on the slowness of the judiciary). The Brazilian police force lacks trained
personnel to detect the entry and exit of drugs along its borders. Id. In 1993, the police
drug control division only consisted of 500 people including administrative staff. Id.
60. See id. Eighty percent of those accused of drug trafficking are released before
facing trial and only 10% of those involved in the drug trade are in prison. Id.; see also
Rocha, supra note 54, at 10 (stating that the Brazilian judicial system allows launderers
who have connections in the political system to escape criminal punishment).
61. See INCSR 1996, supra note 5, at 74; see infra notes 162-163 and accompanying
text (discussing Brazilian laws prohibiting drug trafficking and use of illegal proceeds).
Many countries have comprehensive laws on their books and conduct aggressive enforce-
ment efforts, but still have high volumes of money laundering. INCSR 1996, supra note 5,
at 492. In the late 1980's, Brazil's economic crisis fueled the production, consumption,
and trafficking of illicit drugs. DEMATTos, supra note 54, at 121. See generally Fernando
Cepeda Ulloa, International Cooperation and the War on Drugs, in DRUG TRAnIcKINo IN
Tm AivmRicAs 513 (Bruce M. Bagley & William 0. Walker, EII, eds., 1994) (discussing the
importance of an international legal system to combat drug trafficking).
62. See Money Laundering: U.S. Efforts to Combat Money Laundering Overseas,
Testimony Before the Committee on Banking and Financial Services, House of Represen-
tatives, Feb. 28, 1996 (discussing the necessity for the international community to cooper-
ate against combating money laundering). The G-7 Economic Suminit created the Finan-
cial Action Task Force in 1989 to develop coordinated legislative and enforcement systems
to combat money laundering. ORGAmNSATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND
DEVELOPivmNT, FNANciAL MARKET TRmDS 37 (1995). Members of the G-7 Task Force
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money laundering. Illicit drug money is not likely to contribute positive net re-
sults to growing economies and societies.6 3 Furthermore, because unilateral ef-
forts are inefficient, a concerted multilateral effort will facilitate detection and
cessation of international money laundering.64
1. Adoption of United States 1988 Narcotics Convention
On December 19, 1988, at a United Nations65 conference in Vienna, Austria,
one hundred and six countries adopted by consensus the United Nations Conven-
tion Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances. 6 The
include: Austria, Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany,
Greece, Hong Kong, Iceland Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zea-
land, Norway, Portugal, Singapore, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, the United King-
dom, the United States, the Commission of the European Union, and the Gulf Co-
Operation Council. Id. at 64 n.1; see also Samuel, supra note 4, at 183-84 (discussing the
development of the Financial Action Task Force).
63. See Solomon, supra note 4, at 439 (discussing the negative effects of illicit drug
money on economies and societies); see also Ellen Leander, How Money Launderers Are
Fighting Back, GLOBAL FIN., Feb. 1996, at 54 (stating that money laundering is growing
into a $1 trillion business, facilitating the growth of criminal activity).
64. See Solomon, supra note 4, at 441 (explaining the necessity for efforts by multiple
countries to combat international money laundering). The increased development of anti-
money laundering laws has stimulated more sophisticated money laundering practices. Id.
For example, in order to avoid mandatory reporting requirements, launderers make depos-
its of less than $10,000, a practice knon as "smurfing." See generally Solomon, supra
note 4 (discussing in detail the art of "smurfing"). The executive director of the United
Nations, Giorgio Giacomelli, stated, "International coordination is essential in the , ur on
drugs." Gustavo Gonzalez, Latin American Drugs: U.N. Pulls Southern Cone Together,
ITmPREss SmwicE, Dec. 21, 1995, available in WESTLAW, 1995 WL 10136412.
65. See Yearbook of Int'l Org., 1, 1490-93 (Union of International Organizations ed.,
32d ed. 1995/1996). The United Nations represents more than one hundred and fifty-nine
states, aggregating nearly ninety-eight percent of the 'wrld's population. Id. at 1490-93.
Considering its tremendous range of membership, the United Nations welds a significant
amount of influence. Id. This influence is visible by the international effort to bring ef-
fective law enforcement measures against drug trafficking by criminalizing money laun-
dering. See e.g., David P. Stewart, Internationalizing The War on Drugs: The UN Con-
vention Against illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances, 18 Dsrv.
J. INT'LL. & POL'Y 387, 387 (1990) (detailing the development of the United Nations ini-
tiative against narcotic drugs and money laundering); Bruce Zagaris, Developments in In-
ternational Judicial Assistance and Related Matters, 18 DsiV. I. INr'L L. & POL'y 339,
340-48 (1990) (discussing the development of the United Nations 1988 Narcotics Confer-
ence and detailing the elements of the international agreement); vrilliam B. McCallister,
The International Nexus: Where Worlds Collide, in Duatu TRAMcm w THE A.mERIAs,
521 (Bruce M. Bagley & William 0. Walker I, eds., 1994) (discussing the history of nar-
cotics control and the successes and failures of the international drug control system).
66. Final Act, including resolutions, and the United Nations Convention Against Illicit
Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances, U.N. Doc. E/ConE 82/14 (1988)
[hereinafter UN Convention]. The Convention came into force on November 11, 1990 af-
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Convention established a framework for placing international controls on money
laundering, thus setting the standard for international money laundering efforts to
follow.67
The Convention requires signatory nations to make money laundering a crimi-
nal and extraditable offense. 68 The signatories must take necessary legislative
and administrative measures that conform with the fundamental provisions of
their respective legislative systems.69 In carrying out their obligations, nations
must ensure that measures are consistent with the principles of sovereign equality,
territorial integrity, and non-intervention in the domestic affairs of other states.70
Finally, a signatory nation may not undertake the exercise of jurisdiction and
performance of functions in the territory of another nation that domestic law in
the other nation exclusively reserves for its own authorities.71
Article 3 of the Convention defines the offenses and sanctions,]2 Each signa-
tory agrees to make criminal the following acts: 1) the management or financing
of the cultivation or manufacture of psychotropic substances,73 2) the conversion
or transfer of property derived from drug trafficking, 74 and 3) the concealment or
disguisement of the true nature of property derived from drug trafficking.'" The
United Nations based these provisions criminalizing money laundering on the
United States statutes. 76 Although Article 3 requires nations to make these of-
fenses criminal, the adoption of the provisions is subject to a nation's constitu-
tional principles and the basic concepts of its legal system.77
ter the minimum of twenty governments had deposited instructions of ratification with the
United Nations. See Solomon, supra note 4, at 442 (discussing the adoption of the United
Nations Convention in Vienna, Austria in 1988); see also U.S. DEP'T oF STATE, INT'L
NARconc CoNTROL STRATEGY R.F_. 411 (1992) [hereinafter INCSR 1992] (discussing the
adoption of the United Nations Narcotics Convention).
67. See infra notes 103, 108, 171 and accompanying text (discussing the development
of international initiatives).
68. UN Convention, supra note 66, art. 3. The Convention lays out a broad frame-
work for signatory nations to promote effective control of the international drug trade.
69. Id. art. 2(1). The signatories must enact legislation and implement regulations.
Id.
70. Id. art. 2(2).
71. Id. art. 2(3).
72. Id. art. 3.
73. UN Convention, supra note 66, art. 3(a)(i). Psychotropic substances and narcotic
drugs mean any substance, natural or synthetic. Id. arts. 1(n), 1(r).
74. Id. art. 3(b)(i).
75. Id. art. 3.
76. See Alford, supra note 3, at 442 (commenting that the UN provisions that make
money laundering criminal are similar to United States statutes); supra notes 36-46 and
accompanying text (discussing the United States statutes which make money laundering
criminal).
77. UN Convention, supra note 66, art. 3 (2). This provision allows nations substan-
tial room for interpretation and delay in their enactment of laws. See Alford, supra note 3,
at 443 (stating this provision can potentially undermine the purpose of the Convention);
see also Stewart, supra note 65, at 393 (stating that negotiating countries encountered dif-
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Brazil signed the United Nations Convention and the Brazilian Executive
Branch declared its entry into force in June, 1991.78 According to the United
States Department of State, however, Brazil is not complying with the regulations
of the Convention.I 79 If Brazil repealed its bank secrecy law and enacted provi-
sions that allowed undercover operations, it would begin to align itself with the
spirit of the Convention.
2. Basle Committee Minimum Standards
The Basle Committee on Banking Regulations and Supervisory Practices con-
sists of representatives from the central banks and supervisory authorities of the
major industrialized nations."' In December 1988, the Basle Committee adopted
a Statement of Principles that addressed money laundering. 82 The Committee
stated that a bank should make reasonable efforts to "determine the true identity"
of its customers,83 commonly referred to as the "know-your-customer nle."04
This rule discourages money launderers from using banks because national and
international banks require evidence of a customer's true identity.85
ficulties when drafting precise definitions that could be acceptable to varying legal sys-
tems).
78. DE MATTos, supra note 54, at 133. The Brazilian Senate approved the 1988 UN
Convention on June 12, 1989. Id. The Brazilian Chamber of Deputies passed the Conven-
tion onMay 23, 1990. Id.
79. See INCSR 1996, supra note 5, at 73, 75 (commenting that Brazil has been con-
templating passage of the necessary legislation since 1991).
80. Id. at 75 (stating that Brazil needs to enact money laundering legislation to be in
compliance with the UN Convention).
81. See Duncan E. Alford, Basle Committee Minimum Standards: International
Regulatory Response to the Failure of BCCI, 26 GEo. WASmL J. fN'r'LL. & EcoN. 241,241
n.1 (1992) (listing the twelve nations participating in the Task Force). The nations, which
meet in Basle, Switzerland, include: Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Great Britain,
Luxembourg, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United States.
Id.
82. See e.g., National Banks Alerted to Statement ofPriniples on Money Laundering,
1 Fed. Banking L. Rep. (CCII) 87,606 (Jan. 9, 1989) [hereinafter Basle Principles]; The
Basle Committee's New 'Minimum Standards," SPECIAL Supi F.mNmr FiN. REao. Rp., June
1992, at 1 [hereinafter Basle New Minimum Standards]; Alford, supra note 81, at 241
(tracing the historic development of the Basle Committee and analyzing the formation of
the new ' minimum standards").
83. See Prevention of Criminal Use of the Banking System for the Purpose of Maoney
Laundering, reprinted in 1 Fed. Banking L. Rep. (CCH) J 52-351 (Dec. 1988) [hereinafter
Banking Restrictions].
84. See Costello, supra note 44, at 33-36 (discussing the details of the "know-your-
customer" rule). Bank supervisors cannot be indifferent to the criminal use of the banking
system. Id. at 38. This type of indifference may cause banks to suffer losses through fraud
or the adverse effects of being associated with criminals. Id.
85. See Alford, supra note 3, at 444-45 (discussing the importance of inter-bank regu-
lations). The Committee recognizes that the main purpose of bank supervisors is to main-
tain the financial stability of banks and not to ensure the legitimacy of individual banking
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On July 6, 1992 the Basle Committee issued new minimum standards regard-
ing governmental regulation of international banks.8 6 The four principle ele-
ments are: 1) a home country authority should supervise any international bank-
ing group, 87 2) the creation of a cross-border banking establishment requires the
prior consent from the host-country's supervisory authority and the requesting
bank's supervisory authority,88 3) supervisory authorities should possess the right
to gather information from the cross-border banking establishments of the banks
or banking groups for which they are the home-country supervisor,89 and 4) if a
host-country authority determines that any one of the foregoing minimum stan-
dards is not met to its satisfaction, that authority can impose restrictive measures,
including the prohibition of the creation of banking establishments. 90
The Basle Committee's Statement of Principles lacks enforcement under inter-
national law. 91 Its implementation depends on each individual nation's legal sys-
tem. The Committee, however, works closely with international organizations in
order to strengthen the implementation of its suggestions 9
2
The Brazilian National Monetary Council decided to adopt the rules of the Ba-
transactions. Banking Restrictions, supra note 83, T 52-351. The association of banks
with criminal activity erodes public confidence and undermines the stability of the banking
system. Alford, supra note 3, at 445.
86. Basle New Minimum Standards, supra note 82, at 1.
87. Id. at 2. For example, in the case of Brazil, the Brazilian Central Bank should su-
pervise the various international branches of Brazilian banks.
88. Id. at 2.
89. Id. at 3. For instance, the Brazilian Central Bank may receive information con-
cerning the operation of its banks abroad and consent to sharing information with foreign
supervisors such as the United States Federal Reserve or the Office of the Comptroller of
Currency.
90. Id. at 3-4.
91. See Alford, supra note 3, at 445 (stating the minimum standards as the most effi-
cient standards and procedures in the banking industry).
92. See Alford, supra note 81, at 241 (discussing the Basle Committee's international
influence). For example, the Basle Committee strongly encouraged the international
banking community's coordinated approach toward monitoring the Bank of Credit and
Commerce International ("BCCr') when allegations of scandal surrounded the Bank. Id.
The international community eventually forced the BCCI to close its operations in 1991, an
action that demonstrated the Committee's increasing role in the regulation of international
money movement. See id. at 241 (analyzing the fall of the BCCI and the response of the
international community). In the case of the BCCI, launderers deposited the illicit pro-
ceeds into banks in the United States and later wired them to a BCCI branch in Tampa,
Florida. Solomon, supra note 4, at 437. The next wire transfer occurred through a New
York bank to BCCI headquarters in Luxembourg. Id. at 437. The money was then trans-
ferred/routed to BCCI of London with instructions to place the money in a certificate of
deposit. Id. The certificate converted into security for a loan for a shell company in the
Bahamas. Id. The loan was wired back to the account in Tampa which transferred the
money to Uruguay which was finally converted into cash in Colombia where the launderers
could access "clean money." Id.
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sle Accord. 93 The enactment of the Basle Accord, through Resolution 2099, es-
tablished new standards for gauging the stability of the Brazilian financial system
and for standardizing the rules for evaluating the stability of banking and finan-
cial institutions among the signatory countries.- 4
By incorporating the Basle Accord Regulations, Resolution 2099 emerges as a
comprehensive piece of economic legislation. The law consolidates the rules
authorizing the operation of banks and the opening of branches and other offices.
Furthermore, Resolution 2099 establishes a minimum capital requirement for fi-
nancial institutions that operate in Brazil.
Brazilian banks express concern that their clients will abandon them because
of both the infringement on the bank's long-standing confidentiality rules and the
overall instability to the banking system.95 Concern, on behalf of the Brazilian
bankers and clients, may stem from the Brazilian Government's negotiations with
offshore jurisdictions to repeal bank secrecy regulations.96
On the other hand, the Basle Accord meets with criticism for not adopting a
global system for risk analysis.9 7 Undeniably, the Basle principles benefit Brazil
especially as it reenters the international financial markets. Foreign investment
continues98 and several Brazilian broker/dealers are placing bonds abroad. Insti-
tutions critical of the Accord, therefore, should welcome the adoption of the inter-
national standards. Problems will arise as to the correct interpretation of the rules
for specific transactions. The Basle regulations, however, demonstrate a positive
step for a country that intends to find a place in the international financial mar-
ket
99
3. Organization of American States
The Organization of American States (OAS) operates as a multinational or-
93. Resolugo N. 2099, 17 Agosto 1994, 58 Coletiinea de Legislazo e Jurisprudencia
1230 (1994) [hereinafter Resolution 2099].
94. See id. art. 1, annex (l)-(IV). The Resolution discusses: a) authorization for op-
eration, b) minimum limits of paid-up capital and net worth, c) installation and operation
of offices in Brazil, and d) the necessity of maintaining net worth in balance with the de-
gree ofrisk ofthe asset sructure. Id. art. 1, annex I.
95. More Control Needed, LATIN AM. L. & Bus. REP., Nov. 30, 1995, at 7. The con-
cern stems from the numerous Brazilians involved in the underground economy. Id. An
estimated 30 million Brazilians earn money from the underground economy. Id.
96. Id. Among other countries, Brazil is negotiating vith the Cayanan Islands. Id.
97. See generally Alford, supra note 81, at 270-74 (discussing the weaknesses in the
principles).
98. See Roundup of Economic Reports Through 29 Nov., Fo.REIG BROACAST INO.
SEvic FOR LATN AM, Nov. 30, 1995, at 26 (discussing the recent trends in foreign in-
vestment).
99. See Roundup of Economic Reports Through 30 Nov., FoRIGN BRoAucAs-r Itzo.
SERvica FOR LATrNAM., Nov. 30, 1995, at 25 (reviewing basic economic indicators in fi-
nancial investments).
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ganization dedicated to the process of peace and development in the Americas.1 "
The Inter-American Program of Action of Rio de Janeiro Against the Illicit Use
and Production of Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances' 01 recommended
that the countries of the OAS form a regional Inter-American Drug Abuse Con-
trol Commission (CICAD).10 2
OAS representatives examined CICAD's progress at the Inter-American
Meeting of Ministers in Ixtapa, Mexico in 1990.103 The representatives at this
meeting outlined twenty points in the Declaration and Program of Action of Ix-
tapa.'0 4 These representatives also enumerated five specific actions pertaining to
money laundering. 05 Most importantly, the representatives suggested that an
Inter-American group of experts draft model regulations that conform with the
United Nations Convention on narcotics.' 06 The Ministers recommended that an
100. Yearbook of Int'l Organization, 1, at 1291 (Union of International Organization
ed., 1995/1996) (stating the essential aims of the Organization of American States).
101. See Execution of the Legal Development Project, I OEA/ser.L/X[V.2.15,
CICAD/doc. 585/94 (1994). The Rio Program emphasized the need for measures to har-
monize relevant legislation among OAS member states such as: 1) authorization of forfei-
ture of assets derived from illicit drug trafficking while controlling precursors and other
chemicals essential for the manufacture of narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances, 2)
support for crop substitution and eradication of illicit production, and 3) creation of an ef-
ficient system of cooperation among anti-drug agencies and the judicial systems of member
states. Id.
102. CICAD stands for Comisi6n Interamericana Para el Control del Abuso de Drogas
(Inter-American Drug Abuse Control Commission). CICAD is an "autonomous regional
organization" within the OAS. Solomon, supra note 4, at 444.
103. Meeting of Ministers on the Illicit Use and Production of Narcotic Dngs and
Psychotropic Substances and Traffic Therein-Alliance of the Americas Against Drug
Traffic, OEA/ser.K/XXVII.2.1, RM/NARCO/doc. 29/90 rev.1 (1990) (Spanish version)
[hereinafter Ixtapa 1990]. Eighteen members of the OAS signed the Declaration and Pro-
gram for Action: Argentina, the Bahamas, Bolivia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Columbia, the
Dominican Republic, Guatemala, Honduras, Jamaica, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Mexico,
Surinam, the United States, and Venezuela. Id.
104. Ixtapa 1990, supra note 103, at 3-8. These twenty principles established
CICAD's priorities for the following ten years. Id.
105. Id. at 5. The first step emphasized the need for legislation that criminalized all
activities related to the laundering of property and proceeds related to drug trafficking.
This first step also emphasized the need for laws that enable law enforcement to identify,
trace, seize, and forfeit such property and proceeds. Id. at 4. Second, CICAD suggested
that member states encourage banks and financial institutions to cooperate with the appro-
priate authorities in order to prevent the laundering of property and proceeds related to il-
licit drug trafficking and to facilitate the identification, tracing, seizure, and forfeiture of
such property and proceeds. Id. Furthermore, the CICAD representatives encouraged its
member countries to develop mechanisms and procedures for bilateral and multilateral co-
operation aimed at the prevention of money laundering related to illicit drug trafficking
within the framework of their respective legal systems. Id.
106. Ixtapa 1990, supra note 103, at 5. The primary purposes of the model regulations
would be to: 1) criminalize laundering of property and proceeds related to illicit drug traf-
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Inter-American expert group forward the model regulations to the United Nations
General Assembly for consideration by its Expert Group on Money Launder-
ing.1 07
On March 10-13, 1992, at CICAD's eleventh regular session, its members con-
sidered and approved the Model Regulations Concerning Laundering Offenses
Connected to Illicit Drug Trafficking and Related Offenses."' The Model Regu-
lations complement Latin American civil and common law legal systems and pre-
pare legal models conditioned for enactment, individually or as part of a compre-
hensive program.109 Although the Model Regulations are not binding, they serve
as a suggested statutory framework~"°
Article Two of the Model Regulations addresses the offense of money laun-
dering. 1 ' According to Article Two, money laundering occurs when "any person
converts or transfers property and knows, should have known, or is intentionally
ignorant of the fact that such property is proceeds from illicit traffic or related of-
fenses."112 A court or another competent authority will investigate, try, judge,
ficking; 2) prevent the use of financial systems for laundering, conversion or transfer of
property or proceeds, 3) enable authorities to identify, trace, seize and forfeit property and
proceeds related to illicit drug trafficking, 4) change legal and regulatory systems to ensure
that bank secrecy laws do not impede effective law enforcement and mutual legal assis-
tance; and 5) study the feasibility of reporting large currency transactions to national gov-
ernments and permit governments to share such information. Id.
107. Id.
108. Organization of American States, CICAD, Model Regulations Concerning Lmm-
dering Offenses Connected to Illicit Drug Trqffcking and Related Offenses, AGWBES.
1198 (1992) (XXIO-92) [hereinafter Model Regulations]. The development of the OAS
Model Regulations focuses attention on drug producers and traffickers rather than on the
demand side of the drug problem. Solomon, supra note 4, at 447 n.99.
109. Model Regulations, supra note 108, at introduction.
110. See Solomon, supra note 4, at 444-45 (describing the legal effect of international
agreements on domestic policies). When the label "soft law" attaches to intergovernmen-
tal organization recommendations or resolutions they are not binding on member states.
See Solomon, supra note 4, at 444-46 (providing a general history of the regulations). The
actual model facilitates the enactment of legislation for member countries that do not have
vast resources to develop anti-money laundering legislation. Id. at 445. Critics claim that
a broader definition of money laundering %Nould have criminalized more illegal acts that
facilitate money laundering. Id. at 450.
111. Model Regulations, supra note 108, art. 2.
112. Id. art. 2(1). It is criminal to acquire or possess property derived from drug pro-
ceeds. Id. art. 2(2). An offense is also committed when one "conceals, [deceives,] or im-
pedes the establishment of the true nature, source, location, disposition, movement, rights
with respect to, or ownership of property and Imows, should have kmovn or is intentionally
ignorant that such property is proceeds from illicit traffic or related offenses." Id. art. 2(3).
Finally, an offense is committed by "any person who participates in, associates with, con-
spires to commit, attempts to commit, aids and abets, facilitates and counsels, incites,
publicly or privately, the commission of any of the offenses" previously mentioned. Id. art.
2(4). These regulations receive criticism for only applying to money laundering that fa-
cilitate drug trafficdng. Id. art. 8. See also Solomon, supra note 4, 449-50 (analyzing and
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and punish money laundering offenses separately from other illicit drug traffick-
ing or related offenses." 3 Pursuant to Article Two, the court possesses the
authority to order that all property,"' proceeds,"' or instrumentalities n 6 con-
nected with the crime be forfeited and disposed of in accordance with the law.'
A court or competent authority may also order the forfeiture or seizure of property
when the crimes committed violate the laws of another country if such acts would
be criminal if committed within the second nation's jurisdiction.",,
Article Ten of The Model Regulations directly addresses the lenient banking
regulations in South America. This article establishes various regulations for fi-
nancial institutions." 9 These regulations include a requirement that financial in-
suggesting recommendations for the Model Regulations). "Knowledge, intent or purpose
as required as an element of an offense may be inferred from objective, factual circum-
stances." Id.; see Model Regulations, supra note 108, art. 2(5) (stating the requirements
for knowledge).
113. Model Regulations, supra note 108, art. 2(6). Jurisdiction, under Article three of
the Model Regulations, states that: "the crime will be tried whether or not the illicit traffic
or related offenses occurred in another territorial jurisdiction, without prejudice to extradi-
tion when applicable in accordance with the law." Id. art. 3.
114. Id. art. 1(1). Property is defined as "assets of every kind, whether corporal or in-
corporeal, movable or immovable, tangible or intangible, and legal documents or instru-
ments evidencing title to, or interest in, such assets." Id.
115. Id. art. 1(7). The regulations define proceeds as "any property derived from or
obtained, directly or indirectly, through the commission of illicit traffic or related of-
fenses." Id.
116. Model Regulations, supra note 108, art. 1(5). The regulations define instrumen-
tality as "something that is used in or intended for use in any manner in the commission of
illicit traffic or related offenses." Id. art. 1(5).
117. Id. art. 5(1). If the property described in Article 5(1) cannot be forfeited, the court
has the opportunity to order the "forfeiture of any other property of equivalent value or may
order a fine of such value." Id. art. 5(2). The court may transfer forfeited property, pro-
ceeds, or instrumentalities not required to be destroyed, and will not harm the public or a
government agency, responsible for the seizure of such items, or elsewhere for official use.
Id. The court or competent authority may also sell the property and transfer the proceeds
to the agency assisting in the seizure. Id. The court may also deposit proceeds into the
Special Fund provided for in the Inter-American Program of Action of Rio de Janeiro or
into other funds used to combat illicit drugs. Id.
118. Model Regulations, supra note 108, art. 8.
119. Id. art. 9(l)(a). The Regulations define a financial institution as: "a commercial
bank, trust company, savings and loan association, building and loan association, savings
bank, industrial bank, credit union, or other thrift institution or establishment authorized to
do business under the domestic banking law." Id. Additionally, the Model Regulations
consider a broker or dealer in securities and a currency dealer or exchanger financial in-
stitution. Id. art. 9(1)(b)-(c). The Model Regulations, unlike statutes in the United States,
do not cover insurance companies. Solomon, supra note 4, at 450. In the United States,
the insurance industry stands as a formidable player in money laundering schemes. Id.
Although, the regulations could be interpreted to encompass insurance companies, speci-
fying the insurance industry depends on each adopting country. Id. at 450-51; Model
Regulations, supra note 108, art. 9(l)(c). The inability of financial institutions to maintain
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stitutions accurately identify clients and maintain records for at least five years.120
Article Eleven of The Model Regulations emphasizes that financial institutions
will provide information and records that competent authorities request."~ Such
a request for information and records remains confidential.1 2 Lastly, Article
Eleven suspends all bank secrecy laws which may impede an investigation.Y1
3
Article Twelve stipulates that financial institutions must record cash transac-
tions that exceed an amount that a "competent authority"2' determines. Multiple
cash transactions in which the aggregate sum exceeds the applicable determined
amount constitute a single transaction. 2 5 Article Thirteen requires financial in-
stitutions to report suspicious transactions. 2 6 Specifically, financial institutions
must "pay special attention to all complex, unusual, or large transactions, whether
completed or not; to all unusual patterns of transactions; and to insignificant but
periodic transactions, which have no apparent economic or lawful purpose."' 7
anonymous accounts or accounts with fictitious or incorrect names remains one of the most
important reasons for creating stringent banking reporting requirements. Id. The Model
Regulations do not provide incentives for strict compliance on behalf of the financial in-
stitutions. Solomon, supra note 4, at 452. For example, incentives such as tax breaks for
financial institutions and economic incentives for employers Who report suspicious trans-
actions are excluded from the Model Regulations. Id.
120. Model Regulations, supra note 108, art. 10(4), (5).
121. Id. art. 11(1). Critics of the regulations claim that vdien banks report suspicious
transactions they are unaware of their client's specific unlawful activity. Solomon, supra
note 4, at 450. Therefore information that banks supply should be used to pursue criminal
investigations other than money laundering. Id. at 450 n.127.
122. ModelRegulations, supra note 108, art. 11(1). The information is restricted to the
use of the court or competent authority. Id. Accordingly, this provision aims to keep bank
clients from learning of an investigation of them. Solomon, supra note 4, at 448.
123. Model Regulations, supra note 108, art. 11(4). "The legal provisions referring to
bank secrecy or confidentiality shall not be an impediment to compliance -with the Article
when the information is requested by or shared with the court or other competent author-
ity." Id. This provision avoids any problems wich may arise in jurisdictions ,ahere bank
secrecy laws would force the cessation of official investigations. Solomon, supra note 4, at
448. Articles 12 and 19 also contain exemptions for bank secrecy laws. See generally
Model Regulations, supra note 108, arts. 12, 19 (noting the disclosure of information dur-
ing transactions and in court proceedings).
124. Id. art. 12. The records should include detailed information to assist authorities in
locating the person. Id. art. 12(2). Reporting multiple transactions is only required when a
financial institution's employees, officers or agents have kmowledge of the multiple trans-
actions. Id. art. 12(4). The Model Regulations do not impose an affirmative duty on the
financial institution to inquire whether the multiple transactions exceed the specified
amount Solomon, supra note 4, at 449; cf supra notes 36-45 and accompanying text (dis-
cussing the development and requirements of the United States money laundering law).
125. Model Regulations, supra note 108, art. 12(4).
126. Id. art. 13.
127. Id. art 13(1). Financial institutions should report suspicious activity promptly to
the competent authorities. Id. art. 13(2).
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Article Fourteen discusses the liability of financial institutions1 28 'Vicarious
liability applies to financial institutions for the acts of their employees, staff, di-
rectors, owners, or other authorized representatives who violate the money laun-
dering laws.1
29
To facilitate internal controls of the financial institutions, Article Fifteen re-
quires mandatory compliance programs.13 ° This requirement includes the adop-
tion of strict procedures to ensure the honesty of employees,13 1 "know your client"
programs, 132 and audit checks.
133
The Model Regulations are a suggested statutory framework designed to fa-
cilitate the adoption of anti-money laundering legislation. The Regulations help
countries that do not have the resources to develop their own legislation.13 1 Crit-
ics of the Model Regulations argue, however, that these proposed statutes only
criminalize money laundering linked to drug trafficking and fail to define money
laundering more broadly.' 35  The Model Regulations, however, function as a
framework within which legislative bodies of foreign countries may model their
domestic law.
4. Summit of the Americas
The finance ministers of countries participating in the Summit of the Americas
met in New Orleans, Louisiana in May of 1996136 to discuss the challenges of
achieving stable and sustainable economies. 137 These discussions included finan-
cial crimes.'13  The Communiqud reaffirmed the ministers shared commitment to
combat the laundering of proceeds, properties, and other instrumentalities of drug
trafficking, as well as other illegal activities.' 39
128. Id. art. 14.
129. Id. art. 14(1). Those representing the financial institution who willfully fail to
comply with the Articles 10 and 13 will face criminal liability. Id. art. 14(3).
130. See Model Regulations, supra note 108, art. 15 (setting a minimum guideline for
finical institutions to follow).
131. Id. art. 15(l)(a).
132. Id. art. 15(1)(b).
133. Id. art. 15(1Xc).
134. Solomon, supra note 4, at 446-50.
135. Id. at439-42.
136. Summit of the Americas Meeting of Western Hemisphere Finance Ministers, New
Orleans, Louisiana, May 18, 1996 Joint Comniuniqu6 [hereinafter New Orleans Summit].
137. Id. at 1; see Latin America: Latin American Countries Need to Develop Stable
Financial System, Ministers Say, BNA IN'L Bus. & FN. DAILY, May 21, 1996, at D8
(discussing outcome of New Orleans Summit).
138. New Orleans Summit, supra note 136, at 1.
139. Id. at 4. The Finance Ministers found money laundering a threat to the integrity of
financial markets as well as to economic and political systems. Id. Furthermore, chronic
poverty could potentially undermine democratization and impede the gradual shift towards
capitalism in emerging democracies in Latin America. See Economic Development: Pov-
erty and Money Laundering Focus of Finance Ministers, BNA INT'L Bus. & FIN. DAILY,
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The Summit also encouraged the Inter-American Development Bank (1DB), in
coordination with the Organization of American States (OAS), to develop a
framework for the implementation of a hemispheric plan to provide training and
technical assistance to the financial sector.' 40 This short-term plan would provide
courses in legislation, regulation, investigation, prosecution, and financial intelli-
gence support.' 4 1 Each country seeking assistance would participate in a two step
process: 1) training and technical needs assessment, 142 and 2) training and tech-
nical assistance tailored to the needs of a specific country."'
The Ministers present at the Summit endorsed the obligations undertaken by
their governments upon ratification of the UN Convention at the Buenos Aires
Summit. At this convention the ministers agreed to recommend to their govern-
ments a Plan of Action 144 for a coordinated hemispheric response to combat
money laundering. 145 In the Declaration of Principles set forth in the Buenos Ai-
res Summit, the Summit members emphasized the necessity to: 1) criminalize
money laundering, 2) make the possession proceeds of serious crimes a criminal
offense; and 3) revise or enact laws, regulations, and other policies to facilitate the
identification, seizure, and forfeiture of the proceeds and instrumentalities of
money laundering.' 4 6 The Summit encouraged the legislators to empower their
courts in order to facilitate the sharing of financial and commercial information
with requesting institutions. 47 In particular, countries should consider enacting
and enforcing domestic laws that approve the use of investigative techniques.140
May 21, 1996, at D4 (reviewing initiative of participants at New Orleans Summit).
140. New Orleans Summit, supra note 136, at 6-8. The Inter-American Development
Bank (IDB), the World Bank, and bilateral leaders were asked to address prevention of
financial crimes in their operations, including support for official programs. Id. The IDB
will fund the programs, and other organizations may be asked to finance specific activities.
Id. The establishment of the programs is an effort to support the commitments of the De-
cember 1995 Buenos Aires, Argentina Money Laundering Conference. Id.; see Buenos Ai-
res Communiqu6 1995, supra note 1, at 3-10 (listing detrimental economic consequences
of money laundering); U.S. DEP'T oF TREASURY, TREASuRY Nws, Statement By President
William . Clinton at the Summit of The Americas Ministerial Conference On Money
Laundering, Buenos Aires, Argentina, Dec. 2 1995, RR-751 (declaring the importance of
international conformity of anti-money laundering laws).
141. New Orleans Summit, supra note 136, at 8.
142. Id. at 6-8. Step one includes: 1) inquiring into the unique laws, law enforcement,
economy and banking sector of each country, and 2) development of country-specific rec-
ommendations for training and technical assistance. Id.
143. Id. Step two builds on the assessment of step one and suggests six strategies to
incorporate training and technical needs: a three-week training program, a tramin-the-trainer
module, consultations, a self-instruction module, a linkage to other international training
programs, and technology transfer. Id.; see New Orleans Summit, supra note 136, at 6-8
(describing each of these six strategies).
144. Buenos Aires Communiqu6 1995, supra note 1, at 4.
145. Id.
146. Id. at 3.
147. Id.
148. Id. at 6.
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The judiciary should approve the use of undercover police operations and the use
of electronic surveillance to facilitate the identification and prosecution of crimi-
nals and the forfeiture of proceeds. 149 The Ministers also encouraged a review of
each nation's bank secrecy laws with the goal of determining whether the laws
permit disclosure of financial records to the appropriate authorities.' 50 Finally,
the Ministers recommended the adoption of the OAS/CICAD Model Regula-
tions.151
5. Mutual Agreements with the United States
On April 12, 1995, the Brazilian and United States governments signed a mu-
tual cooperation agreement to reduce the demand of, prevent the illicit use of, and
combat the illicit production and trafficking of drugs.'5 2 This agreement requires
both nations to update their laws concerning money laundering.15 3
Article I states that the two nations agree to exchange pertinent information
and supply equipment, human and financial resources, and mutual technical as-
sistance in order to combat illicit trafficking of psychotropic substances.1 4 Sub-
149. Buenos Aires Communiqu6 1995, supra note 1, at 6
150. Id.
151. Id. at 34; see also U.S. DEP'T oF TREASURY, TREASURY NEWS, Statement of Treas-
ury Secretary Robert E. Rubin Closing Press Conference Of the Buenos Aires Money
Laundering Conference, Buenos Aires, Argentina, Dec. 2, 1995, RR-748 at 29-30 (stating
importance of combating money laundering to cease the drug trade and allow economies
and societies to grow).
152. Mutual Cooperation Agreement Between the Government of the United States of
America and the Government of the Federative Republic of Brazil for Reducing Demand,
Preventing Illicit Use and Combating Illicit Production and Trafficking of Drugs, Apr. 12,
1995, U.S.-Braz. [hereinafter Narcotics Treaty of 1995] (on file with Am. Univ. Journal of
Int'l Law & Policy). When this Treaty enters into force, the Narcotics Treaty of 1986 will
terminate. Id. art. X; see Mutual Cooperation Agreement Between the Governments of
the United States of America and the Federative Republic of Brazil for Reducing Demand,
Preventing Illicit Use and Combating Illicit Production and Traffic of Drugs, Sept. 3, 1986,
U.S.-Braz., T.I.A.S. 11382 (entered into force June 13, 1991). Until he signed the 1995
Agreement, Brazilian President Cardoso expressed his dissatisfaction with the declining
amount of aid offered to Brazil by the United States. In 1993, the United States offered
only $200,000, while in 1987, the United States offered $3.1 million for assistance and
international drug control. Cleber Praxedes, Cardoso To Refuse Minor U.S. Drug En-
forcement Aid, F.B.I.S. FOR LATm AM., Apr. 13, 1995, at 22; see also Maria Helena Ta-
chinardi, Proposed Drug Enforcement Accord with United States Viewed, F.B.I.S. FOR
LATIN AM., Feb. 22, 1995, at 58 (discussing the pretense for the mutual agreement be-
tween the United States and Brazil).
153. Newton Duarte, Lampreia, U.S. Envoy Sign Drug Enforcement Accord, F.B.I.S.
FOR LATIN AM., Apr. 14, 1995, at 20 (commenting on the expansion of and depth of agree-
ment); cf. Jobin Views Anti-Drug Legislation, Reforms, F.B.I.S. FOR LATIN AM., May 9,
1995, at 36 (emphasizing the importance of regional agreements over "generic" accords
with the United States).
154. Narcotics Treaty of 1995, supra note 152, art. I.
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ject to the unique constitutional principles and basic legal concepts present in the
legal systems of the signatories, the signatories agreed to take the steps necessary
to achieve compliance with the UN Convention. These steps include the adoption
of the Model Anti-Money Laundering Regulations of the OAS Inter-American
Commission on Drug Abuse Control. 55 The signatories also agreed to take sub-
stantial measures in order to combat the laundering of financial assets related to
serious crimes'1
56
The initial step requires the implementation of legislation that criminalizes
laundering drug proceeds and requires financial institutions to report suspicious
financial transactions. 57  The agreement encourages preliminary discussions
about cooperation in asset sharing between Brazil and the United States.'5 This
cooperation is an important measure designed to help Brazil enact anti-money
laundering legislation and require due diligence by its banks and financial insti-
tutions.
B. CURRENT BRAZILIAN LAWS
The supreme law of Brazil is the Federal Constitution. s' 9 Each state' 60 has an
individual constitution and an elected government.161 In 1976, Brazil enacted its
first narcotics law, Law 6368,162 which criminalized the illegal traffic and misuse
of drugs that cause psychological dependence.163  Additional laws to prevent
money laundering in Brazil will inevitably deter foreign investment.'" None-
155. Id. art. Il
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. More Control Needed, supra note 95, at 17. The Agreement also requires imple-
mentation of legislation authorizing the seizure and forfeiture of property and financial as-
sets. Narcotics Treaty of 1995, supra note 152, art. IL The parties also agreed to consider
the future sharing of proceeds from successful forfeiture efforts. Id.
159. DE ITros, supra note 54, at 122. The constitution was amended and published
on October 5, 1988. Id.
160. Id. Brazil is a federal republic composed of twenty-six states and a federal district
in which the capital is located. Id.
161. See id. (providing a brief overview of the Brazilian legal system); Brazil Law Di-
gest, in Selected International Conventions Martindale-Hubbell Law Digest, at Brz-3
(1996) (providing an overview of Brazil's constitution and government).
162. LEIN. 6.368, 21 Octubro 1976, XL Coletfuiea de Legislaqio e Jurisprudencia 775
(1976).
163. DE MArros, supra note 54, at 123-31 (documenting the extensive history of Bra-
zilian bills passed on drugs since 1940); see also LEI N. 7.560, 19 Dezembro 1986, L
Colet&uea de Legislagao e Jurisprudncia 1280 (1986) (criminalizing the goods obtained as
a result of drug trafficking or related activities); LEI N. 9.017, 30 larqo 1995, 59
Coletfnea de Legislago e Jurisprud~ncia 541 (1995) (setting forth rules to control the
surveillance of chemical products and other substances that cause physical or psychological
dependence).
164. See Solomon, supra note 4, at 452 (commenting on the importance of considering
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theless, the United States views these laws as a desirable and necessary step to
combat money laundering.165  Such laws may, however, disrupt the Brazilian
economy.'"
C. PROPOSED ANTI-MONEY LAUNDERING LAW
Inadequate banking and monetary transaction legislation facilitates money
laundering in Brazil.i 67 A lack of coordination between the police, Justice De-
partment, Internal Revenue Service, and the Central Bank makes it almost impos-
sible to control suspect accounts under the protection of bank secrecy laws.' 68
Furthermore, the lack of control over exchange houses'6 9 and the underground
the effect of money laundering laws on developing countries); LEI N. 9.017, 30 Margo
1995, 59 Coletfinea de Legislagio e Jurisprudncia 541 (1995) (establishing an obligation
for any financial institution with cash deposits or inflow and outflow of cash to provide a
security system approved by Ministry of Justice).
165. Solomon, supra note 4, at 449-53.
166. Id. at 452. The imposition of United States regulations should be backed with
economic assistance to Brazil to facilitate the aggressive investigation and prosecution of
money laundering signs. Id. at 453 (encouraging United States to provide financial assis-
tance to facilitate developing economies to establish anti-money laundering laws); see
generally Foreign Ministry Denies End to U.S. Anti-Drug Aid, F.B.I.S. FOR LATiN AM.,
Jan. 18, 1995, at 43 (discussing the United States promise to Brazil that the United States
would not cut anti-drug financial assistance); Ayrton Centeno, Justice Minister °Unaware'
of U.S. Drug Aid Suspension, F.B.I.S. FOR LArIN AM., Jan. 17, 1995, at 43 (reporting to
Brazilians that its government will petition the United States for increased financial aid
and technical assistance to fight the war on drugs).
167. INCSR 1996, supra note 5, at 73-74.
168. Cf. Vannildo Mendes, Drug and Remittances Total $1 Billion Yearly, F.B.I.S. FOR
LATINAM., Dec. 13, 1994, at 33 (stating that in the case of an exchange house, Casa Piano,
the Brazilian Federal Supreme Court authorized the seizure of documents, the interroga-
tion of employees, and the suspension of bank secrecy in response to a court petition from
The Hague, Netherlands).
169. FINANCIAL ACTION TASK FORCE ON MONEY LAUNDERING ANNUAL REPORT 1994-
1995, in Financial Market Trends, No. 62, Dec. 1995, at 65. The Financial Action Task
Force (FATF) acknowledged the increasing use of exchange houses in money laundering
schemes. Id. FATF suggested several necessary counter-measures to deter their use. ld.
The exchange houses need to be under a regulatory scheme to enforce continuous reporting
requirements. Id. at 65-67. Throughout Central and South America, exchange houses
launder an estimated $100 billion in drug profits each year. Douglas A. Kotlove, Casas de
Cambio: Currency Exchange Houses or Money Laundering Hubs for Drug Traffickers ? in
Focus ON MONEY LAuNDERING & AssET FoRFErruRE: AN INT'L PERSP., Sept. 1994, at 18
(discussing the rise of exchange houses as safe options for money launderers). Exchange
houses (casa de cambio) are usually owned and operated by affluent persons. Id. at 17. On
a daily basis, large sums of cash, travelers checks, and personal and cashier checks are ex-
changed for currency. Id. at 29-33 (examining various types of illegal activity in Mexico
and South America). A mid-size exchange house along the Mexico-United States border is
capable of making $500,000 to $700,000 a year, while a large exchange house makes over
one million dollars a year. Id. at 31. Most of these exchange houses are part of travel
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lottery' 70 allows money launderers to develop efficient mechanisms Vwth which to
convert illegal proceeds. Unless these financial crimes are strictly p-nalized, the
enforcement of the money laundering law will be extremely difficult."'
agencies vhich are authorized to conduct transactions involving United States currency.
Zagaris, supra note 53, at 17; see also Kotlove, supra, at 34-38 (discussing various United
States legislative efforts to deter money laundering in exchange houses and offer alterna-
tive solutions). The use of exchange houses is an excellent means by xviuch money laun-
derers avoid the banks' $10,000 reporting requirement Pierre F.V. Merle, The New Fo-
cus- Casa de Cambio, Money Transmitters, and Non-Bank Financial Institutions, in
Focus oN MoNY LAUNDERMG & AssET FoarnErrun : AN INT'L PERsP., Sept. 1994, at 14
(discussing the new methods of money laundering with the increased controls on banks).
The laws are structured so that the only available legal recourse against failure to report
large transactions is as a tax crime. Zagaris, supra note 53, at 17-1. The bank secrecy
laws prohibit the investigation of these transactions. Id. at 18. The acting director of the
Federal Police in Brazil confirms the use of exchange houses for the laundering of drug
money and states that the only method to curtail the activity is with constitutional revisions
and the elimination of bank secrecy laws. PF Official Backs US. Money Laundering
Charge, F.BIS. FORLATiN A2., Mar. 6, 1995, at 38. Under the current law, the Central
Bank supervises only banks; there is no regulatory agency for money exchanges. Id. The
head of the National Federation of Federal Policemen claims that the laws need to be
changed. Id. Both officials, however, insinuated that their requests, as well as court pro-
ceedings, are not acted upon because the money launderers have connections everywhere.
Id.
170. See Link Between Illegal Lottery, Drug Trafficking Reported, F.B.LS. FOR LATIn
AM., Mar. 11, 1994, at 26 (commenting on the connection between the illegal lottery and
drug trafficking); Lack of Will to Fight Drug Traqffcking, LA=TI AM. N wsL BRAmZn REP.,
May 5, 1994, at 4 (explaining that the Brazilian police have linked the international drug
trafficking business and an illegal lottery with money laundering). The lottery is usually
used as a front for underground crimes of money laundering, drug trafficking and arms
running. Mac Margolis, IA Brazilian Authorities Link Lottery to Political Comrption,
LA Tmnss, Apr. 9, 1994, atA2. The illegal lottery, knowm as 'Jogo do bicho," the animal
game, dates back to the late 1800s. Id. logo do bicho was a favorite pastime for Brazil-
ians and tolerated by the authorities. Id. Recently, the Brazilian prosecutors office uncov-
ered the headquarters ofjogo do bicho and found evidence directly linking its activities to
Colombian representatives of the Medelin drug cartel. Id. Brazil's Federal Prosecutor,
Antonio Carols Biscuit, received the tip from a bookmaker of a leading bichero vho fa-
cilitated the investigation. Id. In Brazil, a conviction for running a gambling operation is
only a misdemeanor, but the link to drug trafficking permits a jail sentence. Lack of Will
to Fight Drug Trafficking, supra, at 4. This discovery threatened to expose corruption
throughout the entire society, ranging from shanty towns to the highest political offices.
Margolis, supra, at A2. It was confirmed from the log books that the bicheros received
payoffs from high ranking officials. Id. Among those on the list were the civil police
(many of whom resigned after exposure), congressmen, judges, prosecutors, a former fed-
eral police superintendent, and Rio de Janeiro's mayor and governor. Id.; see also Sena-
torAsksforLeave ofAbsence OverDrug Charges, F.B.LS. FOR LATIN A., Mar. 22, 1995,
at 54 (investigating Senator Emades Amourium for involvement in drug trafficking).
171. See More Control Needed, supra note 95, at 17 (discussing the tensions between
Brazilian bankers and their clients with the Brazilian Government concerning stricter con-
trols to counter money laundering).
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Brazil recently submitted a money laundering law proposal to the CICAD
Committee. 172  This law, Money Laundering, 173 is similar to the Model OAS
Regulations.17 4 The first chapter makes criminal the act of money laundering and
the concealment of goods, titles and assets 75 resulting directly or indirectly from
the illegal traffic of narcotics related crimes, organized crime, terrorism, or weap-
ons smuggling.' 76 The penalty for these crimes is two to five years imprisonment
and a fine.' 77 Individuals who participate in any aspect of the unlawful activity
are liable for criminal actions' 7 8 and will be found guilty of committing the prin-
ciple crime.' 7 9 Accordingly, this chapter broadens the crime of money laundering
beyond drug trafficking and increases the ability of enforcement agencies to re-
strict the flow of illegal proceeds. 18
Chapter Four concerns the seizure of goods, titles, and assets resulting from
crimes that took place abroad. 18 If a treaty or international agreement exists
with a foreign jurisdiction, a Brazilian judge will determine if the seizure of goods
results from the perpetration of crimes abroad.18 2 In the absence of a treaty or
international agreement, a Brazilian judge will honor the request if the requesting
country assures reciprocity with Brazil.' 83 The proceeds from the seizure will be
divided equally between Brazil and the requesting nation absent an agreement .'
4
This provision is important for Brazil because it allows adherence to the interna-
172. Anteproyecto de ley de Brasil, Reunion del Grupo de Expertos Sobre lavado de
dinero, OEA/ser.L/XlV.4.4, CICAD/LAVEX/doc.l1/96 corr. 1 (1996) [hereinafter An-
teproyecto 1996] (presenting proposed money laundering law before CICAD); see also
Draft Bill Money Laundering Law (visited Mar. 21, 1997) <http://wvww.mj.gov.br>.
173. Anteproyecto 1996, supra note 172.
174. Compare infra notes 175-204 and accompanying text (discussing proposed Brazil-
ian Money Laundering Law) with supra notes 112-33 and accompanying text (analyzing
the OAS Model Regulations).
175. Anteproyecto 1996, supra note 172, ch. I.
176. Id. art. 1.
177. Id.
178. Id. § 1.
179. Id. § l(I). If an individual "knowingly acquires, receives, exchanges, keeps,
stores, moves or transfers, goods, titles or assets resulting or originating from any of the
crimes" in Article One they will be found guilty of having committed the principal crime.
Id. Second, an individual importer is criminally liable for exporting goods of any value for
the purpose of concealing usage of money or assets in the regular market. Id. § l(11).
Furthermore, an individual will be liable for knowingly concealing or disguising the true
nature, origin, locality, disposal, movement, or ownership of goods, titles and assets re-
sulting or originating from a crime above. Id. § 1(1). If the accused collaborates with the
authorities in facilitating the investigation, the sentence, however, may be reduced by up to
two-thirds or entirely suspended by the judge. Id. § 3.
180. Anteproyecto 1996, supra note 172, ch. I.
181. Id. ch. IV, art. 8.
182. Id.
183. Id. § 1.
184. Id. § 2.
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tional initiatives while maintaining Brazil's sovereignty.
Chapter Five is a comprehensive list of those persons who have a duty to
maintain records and information concerning their clients.'85 These persons in-
clude financial institutions, 116 insurance companies, insurance agents, institutions
in charge of welfare and social security, and capitalization institutions.'"'
Chapter Six outlines the reporting requirements for those persons referred to in
Article Nine of the pending legislation.' 88 All institutions mentioned in Article
Nine must identify their clients and maintain a current list of the active clients in
accordance with the terms of the instructions that the appropriate authorities is-
sue.' 89 An institution must keep a specific and individualized registry of all the
transactions made in local or foreign currency, titles of personal property, credit
instruments, precious metals, or any assets that may be converted into cash and
the value of which exceeds the limits that the appropriate authorities set.. 9
The Central Bank of Brazil will receive notification when the transaction ex-
ceeds the limits and conditions that the appropriate authorities set.'9 ' The infor-
mation given to the Central Bank of Brazil is legally confidential.' 92 Institutions
185. Anteproyecto 1996, supra note 172, ch. V, art. 9. The law applies to:
[A]rtificial persons of public or private lawvho permanently or sporadically... "[en-
gage in the following]" principal or secondary activity 1) seizure, mediation and im-
plementation of financial resources from third parties in local or foreign currency 2)
purchase and sale of foreign currency or gold as financial asset or as instrument of
exchange; and 3) custody, issuance, distribution, negotiation, mediation or admini-
stration of titles of personal property.
Id. art. 9(-I).
186. Id. art. 9(m1), § (1)(I). Also required to maintain client records are: companies that
issue identification cards and credit cards as well as deal vith mercantile leases and com-
mercial promotion; societies that distribute moneys or any type of personal property, real
estate, consumer goods, services or that offer discounts in the acquisition of same through
lotteries or similar methods; lending institutions; and foreign entities in Brazil practicing
any of the above. Id. art. 9 (M) § (1)IE-VMI). The following are subject to the same obli-
gations: 'natural or artificial persons who exercise, regularly or sporadically" in Article
Nine; any other entities whfo depend on the authorization of the regulatory organization of
the financial exchange, capital and insurance markets, natural or artificial parsons, domes-
tic or foreign, who act as agents, directors, procurers, person working on a commission ba-
sis, or that in any manner represents the interests of foreign entities vho exercise any of
the activities in Article Nine with or %ithout Brazilian authorization. Id. art. 9(111) § (2)(1-
IV).
187. Id. § (1)1); cf. Model Regulations, supra note 108, art. 9 (commenting on the
absence of insurance companies in the Model Regulations).
188. See supra notes 185-87 and accompanying text (discussing Article Nine).
189. Anteproyecto 1996, supra note 172, ch. VI, art 10(a).
190. Id. art. 10(b).
191. Id. art. 10(c).
192. Id. art. 10(d). The terms of legal confidentiality are set by the appropriate judicial
organization and the requirements specified by the Council for the Control of Financial
Activities (COAF). Id.; see infra notes 202-06 and accompanying text (discussing the
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should keep records for five years following the date of the closing of the account
or after the finalization of the transactions. 1 93 An institution must also keep an
individualized registry when a natural or artificial person, or its related entities
conducts, in a single calendar month, operations with a single institution, con-
glomerate, or group that exceed the appropriate authority's limits. 194 This is an
extremely important provision because it establishes a process by which to trace
the origin of the funds. It will be essential for Brazil to provide substantial train-
ing for the specific employees in charge of this task.
Chapter Seven addresses the reporting of financial operations.19 The required
financial institutions who are contracted or offered suspicious proposals must in-
form COAF' 96 and abstain from informing their clients of the notification. 19,
Furthermore, the whistle-blowers, their comptrollers, administrators, and employ-
ees acting in good faith shall not respond to civil, administrative, or criminal pro-
ceedings for refusing to carry out suspicious operations.'9"
Chapter Eight concerns responsibilities of the administrative staff.199 If the
individuals implicated in Articles Ten and Eleven stop carrying out their obliga-
tions with the objective of promoting the illicit practices, they will face criminal
sanctions.20 0 Requiring incentives for employers to report suspicious transactions
is essential at the inception of the program, considering the amount of corruption
in the government. 201
Finally, Chapter Nine establishes the Council for the Control of Financial Ac-
tivities (COAF). 202 The COAF is authorized to receive, examine, identify, and
functions of the COAF).
193. Anteproyecto 1996, supra note 172, ch. VI, art. 10, § 1. The terms of years can be
increased by the appropriate authority. Id.
194. Id.§2.
195. Id. ch. VII.
196. See infra notes 202-06 and accompanying text (describing COAF).
197. Anteproyecto 1996, supra note 172, ch. VII, art. I §1.
198. Id.§2.
199. Id. ch. Vm.
200. Id. ch. VII, art. 12. Penalties range from 5% to up to three times the value of the
operation; or up to 500% of the profits obtained or profits that would have been obtained;
or a fine of up to two hundred thousand reais, which is equivalent to US $206,000. Id. art.
12 (1) (stating penalty for failing to abide with the reporting requirements). For those per-
sons mentioned in Article nine the following sanctions may apply cumulatively or for ille-
gal acts not mentioned in the Act: 1) a warning, 2) a monetary fine from 1% to up to twice
the amount of the operation or 200% of profits, or 3) temporary disqualification for up to 5
years as an administrator. Id. art. 12 § (1)(IXI(m); see also § 2(1)II) (discussing sanc-
tions for Article Nine persons with premeditation to commit an illicit act),
201. See Joachim Bamrad, The Other Face of Business in Latin America, LATIN TRADE,
Sept. 1996, at 34, 37-39 (discussing the detrimental effects of corruption on growing
economies).
202. Anteproyecto 1996, supra note 172, ch. IX. The organization and functioning of
the COAF will be defined by statute approved by decree of the Executive Power. Id. art.
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investigate suspicious facts related to illicit activities. 203 In addition, the COAF is
responsible for coordinating and establishing methods to share information effi-
ciently.204 The Council will act as the appropriate authority for the establishment
of procedures necessary to combat money laundering. 2" 5 Furthermore, the staff of
the COAF will consist of competent employees of unquestionable reputation and
recognized expertise.2" 6 The establishment of this agency will be crucial to the
success of the enforcement mechanisms of the Money Laundering Law.
VI. RECOMMENDATIONS
Brazil should enact and enforce the Money Laundering Law. The proposed
Money Laundering Law shows Brazil's desire to comply with international efforts
to combat money laundering. 0 7 It is questionable, however, how Brazil will im-
plement this law. The following measures are essential for effective implementa-
tion: 1) the development of comprehensive compliance programs for all members
of the financial industry, 2) the creation of an efficient regulatory body, and 3) the
securance of financial assistance from the United States.
It is to Brazil's national and international economic benefit to enact the pro-
posed Money Laundering Law.2°  If Brazil defers enacting the proposed law, it
will likely alienate nations participating in the international effort to combat
money laundering, including the United States."09 Brazil has the largest economy
in Latin America and the most sophisticated financial sector.21" Even though the
banking industry fears strict regulations,2 1  the adoption of an anti-money laun-
203. Id. art. 13. COAF is established within the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Finance.
Id.
204. Id.
205. Id. art. 14.
206. Id. art. 15. The staff will be appointed by the Ministry of Finance from personnel
of the Brazilian Central Bank, the Commission of Personal Property, the Office of the At-
torney General, the Ministry of Finance, the Department of Internal Revenue, and the Fed-
eral Police Department Id.
207. See Anteproyecto 1996, supra notes 175-206 and accompanying text (discussing
the contents of the proposed law). This law expands the definition of money laundering
which the United Nations Convention and the OAS Model Regulations limited to narcotic
activity. See supra notes 68-75, 111-33 and accompanying text (analyzing the two inter-
national agreements). The law makes criminal the act of money laundering resulting di-
rectly or indirectly from narcotic related crimes, organized crime, terrorism, or weapon
smuggling. Anteproyecto 1996, supra note 172, ch. I, art. 1.
208. See supra notes 175-206 and accompanying text (discussing in detail the proposed
Money Laundering Law).
209. See supra notes 67-80, 82-99, 108-33 and accompanying text (detailing various
international efforts to deter money laundering).
210. U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, NfT'L NARCOTICS CONTMOL STRATEGY REP. 508
(1993) [hereinafter INCSR 1993].
211. See supra note 95 and accompanying text (discussing reasons for apprehension of
banking restrictions).
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dering law will set an example for other South American nations. The attempt to
freeze out money derived from illicit activities will eventually benefit the Brazil-
ian economy by attracting legitimate foreign investors.212 The increase in foreign
investment will help stabilize Brazil's economy.
Effective implementation of the law is crucial to its success. First, Brazil
should create strict compliance programs for the financial industry. The Money
Laundering Law requires banks to report suspicious transactions and maintain
records of monetary transactions.2 13 Specifically, financial companies should
train employees to spot potentially suspicious activity. Suspicious activity can
range from the deposit of large suns of cash, the purchase of luxury items in cash,
the existence of multiple transfers/wires of funds through financial institutions,
and the existence of multiple cash deposits individually below the reporting
minimum,
The financial industry should also enact a program similar to the "know-your-
customer" system. 214 Employees should record substantial customer information
to meet suitability and creditworthiness standards. Once employees discover sus-
picious activity, they should immediately report it to the regulatory authorities.
To avoid corruption and bribery, financial institutions should implement a strict
ethical code rewarding those employees who alert the authorities.
Brazil also needs to create a respectable and efficient regulatory system. The
required adoption of a regulatory system demonstrates Brazil's commitment to
combat money laundering. 215 Without a regulatory agency, Brazil will be passing
a law without enforcement mechanisms. 216  It is essential for the regulatory
agency to aggressively investigate suspicious activity. In addition, the regulatory
system needs to reach out and effectively control nonbanking institutions in order
to prevent launderers from making use of the illegal lottery and exchange
houses. 17 To ensure honesty on behalf of the employees, the regulatory agency
should adopt mechanisms rewarding diligent employees. The regulatory agency
should also provide continuing educational seminars to make employees fiuniliar
with the latest money laundering schemes.
212. See supra notes 95-99 and accompanying text (providing an overview of the Bra-
zilian economy).
213. See supra notes 186-205 and accompanying text (detailing the guidelines in the
proposed law). This aspect of the proposal facilitates international investigations and al-
lows banks to create compliance programs. Anteproyecto 1996, supra note 172, ch. VI,
arts. 10(a)-(c).
214. See supra note 44 (discussing the United States law concerning the "know-your-
customer" rule).
215. See supra notes 202-06 and accompanying text (discussing the details of the regu-
latory agency).
216. INCSR 1996, supra note 5, at 74.
217. See supra notes 168-70 and accompanying text (discussing the use of illegal lottery
and exchange houses to launder money). Institutions which handle large amounts of cash
such as exchange houses, broker/dealers, banks, and jewelry stores must adopt compliance
programs.
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Finally, Brazil should secure financial assistance from the United States to de-
velop the most efficient regulatory agencies and training programs. Insight from
international organizations and financing from the United States will allow Brazil
to begin enforcement sooner and more effectively.
VII. CONCLUSION
Money laundering is a substantial challenge for Brazil due to the volume of
funds derived from criminal activities that pass through its financial institu-
tions. 2 18 Brazil's lack of regulatory bodies and adequate legislation 1 9 combined
with government corruption 220 attract money launderers. More importantly, Bra-
zil currently prosecutes money laundering as a civil matter rather than as a crimi-
nal offense. 221 Brazil must take an aggressive stance on money laundering if it
wants to effectively curb drug tafficldng and other crimes which generate large
amounts of illegal proceeds. The adoption of pending money laundering legisla-
tion is only the first step. The manner in which Brazil implements and enforces
this legislation will determine its eventual success.
218. See INCSR 1993, supra note 210, at 509. The current Brazilian law only permits
disclosure of bank records with a court order, cf. supra notes 36-50 and accompanying
text (discussing United States law addressing the "know-your-customer" rule). Other tpes
of disclosure are prohibited. INCSR 1993, supra note 210, at 509.
219. See INCSR 1996, supra note 5, at 74. The inefficient supervision of the financial
markets facilitates the use of fictitious names viien opening accounts and conducting fi-
nancial transactions. Id. Furthermore, an experienced police force and judiciary also in-
creases opportunities for money launderers. Bamrud, supra note 201, at 38.
220. Bamrud, supra note 201, at 38-39 (discussing the level of corruption found in the
Brazilian government and comparing it to other Latin American countries).
221. INCSR 1993, supra note 210, at 509.
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